A DEAD-ON-ARRIVAL NULLITY: GLOBAL LEGAL CONSORTIUM DEMOLISHES OMOTOSHO FOR TURNING AN UNAUTHORISED AIDE’S MEMO INTO A 20-YEAR SENTENCE

 

Justice James Omotosho’s May 8, 2025, judgment in MultiChoice Nigeria Ltd v. Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (FCCPC) has become a central point of legal criticism over his handling of the case involving detained Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) leader, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu.

In Part 9 of his 150-part legal commentary series, titled “Omotosho’s Ninth Jurisdictional Failure — The MultiChoice Hypocrisy: How a Trial Judge Murdered His Own Precedent, Validated an Unauthorised Coup-Style Proscription, and Gagged Final Addresses to Conceal Judicial Fraud,” Onyedikachi Ifedi, Esq., of the Global Legal Consortium, examines what he describes as a fundamental contradiction between the judge’s interpretation of statutory authority in the MultiChoice case and his handling of the IPOB proscription proceedings.

The central argument is that Justice Omotosho applied strict requirements of presidential authorization when considering the authority of the FCCPC to regulate prices but failed to apply the same legal standard to the IPOB proscription order, which the lawyer maintains was obtained without the personal approval of former President Muhammadu Buhari.

The commentary opens with Justice Omotosho’s pronouncement in the MultiChoice case on May 8, 2025:

“The power to fix prices is exclusively that of the President. Any decision taken without such delegation is a nullity.”

According to Ifedi, the judgment established that where legislation reserves a particular statutory power for the President, another government institution or official cannot exercise that power without the required presidential authorization.

He argues that this same principle should have guided the court’s consideration of the IPOB proscription application and the memorandum submitted by the Federal Government.

ABBA KYARI WAS NOT THE PRESIDENT: THE QUESTION OF PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

A major part of the legal commentary focuses on Section 2(1)(c) of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011, as amended in 2013, which Ifedi identifies as the statutory provision governing the presidential approval required for an application to proscribe an organization.

The lawyer maintains that personal presidential approval was a mandatory condition precedent before the proscription application could be brought before the Federal High Court.

He specifically draws attention to the memorandum submitted by the Federal Government in the IPOB proscription proceedings, which bears the signature of Abba Kyari, the former Chief of Staff to President Muhammadu Buhari.

Ifedi argues that Abba Kyari was not the President of Nigeria and was not the statutory approving authority identified under Section 2(1)(c) of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act.

He insists that the legislature expressly assigned the relevant approval responsibility to the President and that the signature of an administrative aide could not automatically substitute for the President’s personal approval.

The commentary states:

“Abba Kyari was not the President. He was not the statutory approving authority under Section 2(1)(c) of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act. The memorandum produced by the Federal Government bears Kyari’s signature, not Buhari’s. The government cannot substitute the signature of an administrative aide for the presidential approval expressly required by the legislature.”

Ifedi further invokes the legal principle delegatus non potest delegare, which means that a person entrusted with a particular authority cannot simply transfer that authority to another person without lawful permission.

According to him, an executive aide cannot silently assume a statutory power reserved for the Head of State merely because of his position within the Presidency.

He therefore maintains that the memorandum signed by Kyari did not satisfy the statutory requirement for presidential approval.

The lawyer also addresses the role of Justice Abdul Kafarati, who granted the IPOB proscription application in 2018. He argues that the court’s acceptance of the memorandum did not cure the absence of the required presidential authorization.

In his view, an order cannot acquire legal validity simply because a court has issued it where the mandatory statutory condition for exercising jurisdiction was never fulfilled.

He invokes the famous legal principle associated with Lord Denning that something cannot be built upon nothing and expected to stand, arguing that the legal foundation of the proscription order remains fundamentally defective.

MULTICHOICE JUDGMENT: THE SMOKING GUN AGAINST OMOTOSHO’S REASONING

Ifedi describes Justice Omotosho’s judgment in the MultiChoice case as the strongest evidence of the contradiction in his handling of Kanu’s case.

In the MultiChoice proceedings, the judge considered the provisions of Section 88 of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2018, which vests the President with authority to regulate prices of goods and services under specified conditions.

The judge maintained that the FCCPC could investigate exploitative pricing practices and submit its findings and recommendations to the President but could not independently exercise presidential price-fixing powers without the necessary authorization.

The court further held that where the President exercises the power to regulate prices, the required declaration must be made through an order published in the Federal Gazette.

For Ifedi, the significance of the judgment goes beyond the commercial dispute involving MultiChoice and the FCCPC.

He argues that the decision established a legal standard requiring strict compliance whenever legislation assigns an exclusive statutory responsibility to a particular constitutional authority.

The lawyer then compares that position with the IPOB proscription proceedings.

According to him, the same question of statutory authority arose when the Federal Government sought to proscribe IPOB, but the memorandum bearing Abba Kyari’s signature was accepted as sufficient presidential approval.

He argues that Justice Omotosho’s reasoning in the MultiChoice case should equally apply to the IPOB matter because both situations involve the exercise of powers that the law assigns to the President.

Ifedi describes the difference in the treatment of the two matters as selective application of justice.

He maintains that the rule of law cannot be strictly enforced when corporate subscription prices are involved and abandoned when the rights and liberty of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu are at stake.

The lawyer characterises the judge’s position as perverse judicial reasoning, arguing that the legal requirements applied in one case should not be discarded in another simply because the parties and circumstances are different.

THE SILENCING OF FINAL ADDRESSES: A PREEMPTIVE COVER-UP

Another major issue raised in the commentary concerns the refusal to allow Mazi Nnamdi Kanu’s defence to present a final written address in the criminal proceedings.

Ifedi describes the decision as a violation of Kanu’s constitutional right to a fair hearing and argues that the defence should have been given the opportunity to address the court before judgment.

According to the lawyer, permitting the final written address would have allowed Kanu’s legal team to draw the court’s attention to Justice Omotosho’s earlier ruling in the MultiChoice case.

He maintains that the defence could have relied on the May 8, 2025, judgment to challenge the legal foundation of the IPOB proscription order.

The commentary raises a critical question:

How can an unauthorized presidential act be declared a nullity in the MultiChoice case in May 2025, yet be accepted as a valid foundation for proceedings that resulted in a 20-year prison sentence for Nnamdi Kanu in November 2025?

Ifedi argues that Justice Omotosho should have been required to address this apparent contradiction on the official court record.

He accuses the judge of shutting out the defence from presenting an argument that would have exposed the inconsistency between the two judicial positions.

The lawyer further maintains that the denial of a final written address deprived Kanu of an important opportunity to present the full legal implications of the MultiChoice judgment before the court.

He describes the development as a preemptive attempt to prevent the judge’s earlier pronouncement from being used against the legal foundation of the conviction.

THE BLOODY HARVEST: AN UNAUTHORISED ORDER AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR BIAFRAN YOUTHS

The commentary also examines the human rights consequences of the IPOB proscription order, linking its use by security agencies to the treatment of Biafran youths across the South-East.

Ifedi maintains that the proscription order, which he says was obtained without President Buhari’s personal approval and without a fair hearing, became an instrument used by security agencies against IPOB members and young people in the region.

He specifically references Operation Python Dance II, the Nigerian military operation launched in September 2017.

According to the commentary, the operation marked the beginning of intensified military activities against Biafran youths, with security forces using the proscription order as justification for operations involving shooting, torture, arbitrary arrests and detention.

Ifedi states that thousands of young Biafrans across Igboland suffered the consequences of these operations.

He describes the situation as the human cost of what he considers an unlawful proscription order, arguing that a defective judicial order cannot provide legal justification for violations of fundamental human rights.

The lawyer further insists that no court order, whether valid or otherwise, gives the military or police the authority to suspend Chapter IV of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Chapter IV guarantees fundamental rights, including the right to life, personal liberty, dignity of the human person and fair hearing.

He argues that security agencies cannot rely on a proscription order to justify shooting citizens, torturing detainees, conducting arbitrary arrests or executing individuals without trial.

Ifedi maintains that even where an organization has been lawfully proscribed, the action does not remove the constitutional protections enjoyed by individual citizens.

He therefore links the alleged absence of proper statutory authorization in the IPOB proscription proceedings to the wider question of accountability for security operations across the South-East.

CONCLUSION: OMOTOSHO’S OWN WORDS SEAL THE FATE OF HIS JUDGMENT

In his conclusion, Ifedi maintains that Justice James Omotosho cannot escape the legal implications of his own pronouncement in MultiChoice Nigeria Ltd v. FCCPC.

He argues that the statement that any decision taken without the required presidential delegation is a nullity remains a fundamental legal principle that must also apply to the IPOB proscription proceedings.

According to him, Justice Kafarati’s 2018 decision could not cure the absence of the mandatory presidential approval, just as the passage of time could not transform an invalid order into a valid one.

He further insists that the signature of Abba Kyari cannot be substituted for the personal approval of President Muhammadu Buhari where the legislature expressly requires presidential authorization.

The lawyer also maintains that denying Kanu the opportunity to present a final written address could not eliminate the legal questions surrounding the proscription order or prevent the defence from challenging the foundation of the proceedings.

He expresses confidence that the issues raised would become significant grounds for consideration before the Court of Appeal.

Ifedi concludes that a conviction founded upon a proscription order that failed to satisfy mandatory statutory requirements cannot stand and should be set aside by the appellate court.

He further emphasizes that statutory powers belong exclusively to the authorities designated by the legislature, that an administrative aide’s signature cannot automatically replace presidential approval, and that the right to present a final written address must be respected in judicial proceedings.

The commentary ends with a strong declaration:

“STATUTORY POWERS BELONG EXCLUSIVELY TO THE AUTHORITY NAMED BY THE LEGISLATURE. AN AIDE’S SIGNATURE IS NOT PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL. GAGGING FINAL ADDRESSES CANNOT HIDE JUDICIAL HYPOCRISY. A PROSCRIPTION BUILT ON AN UNSATISFIED STATUTORY CONDITION IS A CORPSE IN LAW—AND ANY CONVICTION BUILT UPON IT IS DOOMED AT THE COURT OF APPEAL.”

Onyedikachi Ifedi, Esq.
(For: Global Legal Consortium)

This is Part 9 of 150 in the legal commentary series examining what the author describes as jurisdictional failures in the proceedings involving Mazi Nnamdi Kanu.